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1493 
CRIMINAL RELATIONSHIPS: VERTICAL  
AND HORIZONTAL RELATEDNESS IN 
CRIMINAL RICO 
INTRODUCTION 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
1
 has 
been an immensely successful federal law in the fight against crime in the 
United States. The most extensively used provision of that act is 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c). The text of § 1962(c) reads: ―It shall be unlawful for any person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise‘s affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.‖2 
This Note considers Second Circuit doctrine under the ―pattern of 
racketeering activity‖ requirement. In particular, this Note will analyze the 
horizontal and vertical relatedness elements developed by the Second 
Circuit following the Supreme Court‘s pronouncement that a ―pattern‖ 
requires ―continuity plus relationship.‖3 In short, horizontal relatedness is 
the requirement that there be an interrelationship between the crimes that 
form predicate offenses under RICO. Vertical relatedness is the notion that 
those same offenses must be related to the RICO enterprise. The ultimate 
conclusion is that a clear distinction between these elements is a desirable 
limit on RICO‘s breadth, but that the Second Circuit‘s use of indirect 
relation has erased the boundary between these two elements. 
Judicial interpretations of RICO are not only permissible, but also 
desirable. RICO is a broadly written statute. Coupled with Congress‘s 
silent approval of its broad application by the courts, the only possible 
limits on the statute will come from judicial interpretations of its 
expansive terms. This Note will argue that the elements of horizontal and 
vertical relatedness developed by the Second Circuit act as a limit on 
RICO. Keeping these elements distinct is not only desirable, but also 
preserves the effectiveness of RICO. 
Part I addresses the history of RICO and how the relationship prong of 
the Supreme Court‘s ―continuity plus relationship‖4 test has evolved into 
 
 
 1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 
(2006).  
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
 3. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). 
 4. See id. 
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the horizontal and vertical relatedness elements in the Second Circuit. Part 
II examines why the elaboration of horizontal and vertical relatedness 
elements was a permissible and logical extension of both the ―continuity 
plus relationship‖ test and the language of § 1962. Part III briefly looks at 
the approach taken by other circuits. Part IV explains why the Second 
Circuit‘s use of indirect relation to prove horizontal relatedness is an 
erroneous practice. It also addresses some arguments in favor of retaining 
the use of indirect relation to prove horizontal relatedness. Part V proposes 
three alternative solutions: (1) the Second Circuit should discontinue its 
use of indirect relation; (2) the Second Circuit should dispense with the 
labels of ―horizontal‖ and ―vertical‖ relatedness, and return to an inquiry 
based on the language of the Supreme Court‘s ―continuity plus 
relationship‖ test; or (3) the Second Circuit should clarify its doctrine by 
abandoning the requirement of horizontal relatedness. 
This Note will not consider the element of continuity, which is the first 
prong of the ―continuity plus relationship‖ test established by the Supreme 
Court to determine whether predicate offenses constitute a ―pattern of 
racketeering activity.‖5 This Note is also unconcerned with the enterprise6 
and participation elements, joinder, jurisdiction, or other matters generally 
disposed of by other articles on RICO. The focus of this Note is narrow 
because RICO itself is very broad. An attempt to discuss multiple factors 
would either be short and superficial, or lengthy and complex.
7
 
I. HISTORY 
RICO was passed in 1970 as part of the comprehensive Organized 
Crime Control Act (OCCA).
8
 The push for its enactment came after a 
growing concern with the widespread influence exercised by La Cosa 
Nostra, commonly referred to as the Mafia.
9
 Because of this history, it is 
 
 
 5. Id. For a discussion of this element, see Ross Bagley et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 901 (2007).  
 6. The term ―enterprise‖ is defined as ―any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or 
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 
. . .‖ 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The type of enterprise this Note is concerned with is the so-called 
―associated-in-fact‖ enterprise, which reaches wholly criminal enterprises. See United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981) (―Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it 
could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, ‗legitimate.‘‖). 
 7. For a thorough and in-depth analysis of RICO and all of its implications, see Gerard E. 
Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal (pts. 1 & 2) 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661 (1987), (pts. 3 & 4) 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1987).  
 8. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). 
 9. Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 666–80 (relating the history of RICO from President‘s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967 through introduction of S. 
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widely believed that RICO‘s only purpose was to eradicate organized 
crime.
10
 However, it has been argued that this cannot be true in light of 
constitutional concerns that accompany the targeting of a specific group of 
people with a federal criminal statute.
11
 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself 
has held that there is no requirement of an ―organized crime‖ nexus in the 
statute.
12
 
Other than expanding the list of predicate offenses, Congress has done 
nothing to change the substantive terms of RICO in the more than thirty 
years since its enactment.
13
 Clarification of its provisions has come 
through the courts. The first major interpretation by the Supreme Court 
came in United States v. Turkette.
14
 In that case, the Supreme Court 
determined that the term ―enterprise‖ was not confined to legitimate 
enterprises, but instead included wholly criminal enterprises.
15
 This had 
the effect of making § 1962(c) applicable to groups of individuals 
―associated in fact,‖16 whose only purpose was to commit crimes. 
The broad language of the ―pattern of racketeering activity‖ element of 
§ 1962
17
 was subject to diverse interpretations by the federal circuits.
18
 
The Supreme Court first addressed this element in the now famous 
footnote fourteen of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.
19
 In that footnote, it 
 
 
1861, precursor to bill that would become Organized Crime Control Act); see also S. REP. NO. 91-617, 
at 35–46 (1969) (discussing problem of organized crime, in particular La Cosa Nostra, and the need 
for a response). 
 10. See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to 
Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the End of RICO?”, 
43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 860–68 (1990) (discussing this belief as one of the myths about RICO). 
 11. 116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff) (―I ask my friend, would he not be 
the first to object that in criminal law we establish procedures which would be applicable only to a 
certain type of defendant?‖); see also Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 686. 
 12. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (―We thus decline the invitation to 
invent a rule that RICO‘s pattern of racketeering concept requires an allegation and proof of an 
organized crime nexus.‖). 
 13. Congress has made one amendment to § 1962 since its enactment. It substituted the word 
―subsection‖ for ―subsections‖ in subsection (d). See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 
§ 7033, 102 Stat. 4181, 4398 (1988). 
 14. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
 15. Id. at 580. 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). 
 17. Id. § 1962. 
 18. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989) (noting a ―plethora of different 
views expressed by the Courts of Appeals‖). For a discussion of different approaches taken by the 
Circuits, see Paul William Flowers, Comment, H.J. Inc.: Targeting Federal RICO’s Pattern 
Reqnirement [sic] to Long-Term Organized Criminal Activity, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 717–25 (1990); 
Aaron R. Marcu & Pamela Rogers Chepiga, The Evolution of RICO’s “Pattern-of-Racketeering” 
Element: From Sedima to H.J. Inc. and its Progeny, in CIVIL RICO 1990, 118–20 (1990). 
 19. 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.14 (1985). 
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alluded to the need for ―continuity plus relationship‖20 to satisfy the 
―pattern of racketeering activity‖ requirement. The Court gave its 
definitive statement on this element in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell 
Telephone Co.
21
 
A. H.J. Inc. and the “Continuity Plus Relationship” Test 
In H.J. Inc., a group of customers filed a class action lawsuit against 
Northwestern Bell under RICO‘s civil provision.22 They alleged violations 
of, inter alia, § 1962(c) based on cash payments to the Minnesota Public 
Utilities Commission (MPUC) in exchange for approval of unfair utility 
rates.
23
 The case was dismissed in the district court because it did not meet 
the multiple-scheme test of the Eighth Circuit.
24
 After being affirmed by 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the case went to the Supreme Court.
25
 
At issue was the proper interpretation of § 1962(c)‘s ―pattern of 
racketeering activity‖ element. 
The Court began by reiterating its position in Sedima that RICO should 
not be given a restrictive interpretation.
26
 It noted that the definition of 
―pattern of racketeering activity‖ does not say what the term means, but 
rather gives a minimum necessary condition for the existence of a 
pattern.
27
 Looking to both the language of the statute and its legislative 
history, the Court emphasized its reasoning in the Sedima footnote that 
something more than the statutory minimum number of predicate offenses 
is necessary to establish a pattern.
28
 The H.J. Inc. Court stated that, in 
normal usage, a pattern is an ―arrangement or order of things or activity,‖ 
 
 
 20. Id. (examining legislative history). 
 21. 492 U.S. 229 (1989). 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006). 
 23. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 233. 
 24. Id. at 234. The Eighth Circuit‘s ―multiple schemes‖ test originated in Superior Oil Co. v. 
Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986). While the court concluded that the ―relationship‖ prong of the 
―continuity plus relationship‖ test from Sedima had been met, the ―continuity‖ prong had not. Id. at 
257. Continuity was not established because only ―one isolated fraudulent scheme‖ had been shown. 
Id. The district court in H.J. Inc. interpreted this holding as ―an ‗extremely restrictive‘ test for a pattern 
of racketeering activity that required proof of ‗multiple illegal schemes.‘‖ H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 234. 
 25. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 234–35. The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit‘s multiple scheme test. 
Id. at 240–41. It did so based on its interpretation of the continuity prong of the ―continuity plus 
relationship‖ test. Id. For more on the Court‘s discussion of continuity, see infra note 32 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236. 
 27. Id. at 237 (―It thus places an outer limit on the concept of a pattern of racketeering activity 
that is broad indeed.‖). See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (requiring at least two predicate acts). 
 28. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237–38; see also 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
McClellan) (―[P]roof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a pattern.‖). 
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and it is the ―relationship that they bear to each other or to some external 
organizing principle that renders them ‗ordered‘ or ‗arranged.‘‖29 
However, the statute mentions no requirement of an organizing principle.
30
 
Combining this with the legislative history of RICO, the Court found that 
Congress had in mind a flexible approach to the term ―pattern.‖ But this 
term, the Court said, was not intended to apply to isolated or sporadic 
activity.
31
 Relying on statements in the legislative history, the Court then 
held that a RICO pattern requires that the predicate offenses ―are related, 
and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.‖32 
The Court then quickly dispensed with the meaning of relatedness by 
referring to another section of the OCCA, which defined pattern in terms 
of the relationship between acts.
33
 Under that section, relationship entails 
―acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, 
or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not isolated events.‖34 However, the Court refrained 
from establishing a more detailed method for understanding how these 
factors contribute to the concept of a ―pattern.‖ Instead, it left further 
development to the lower courts.
35
 Applying the concept of relatedness to 
 
 
 29. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 239. 
 32. Id. (internal emphasis omitted); see also S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158 (1969) (―It is this factor 
of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.‖). The Court noted that the proof 
required for relatedness and continuity would often overlap. However, it did not elaborate on how this 
overlap may occur. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239. It may be worthwhile, in a future article, to investigate 
whether this is a desirable assumption. But it is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 The Court‘s discussion of continuity is much longer than its discussion of relatedness. It can be 
either closed-ended (a closed period of related conduct) or open-ended (past conduct with a threat of 
repetition). Id. at 241. Closed-ended continuity entails related predicate offenses occurring over a 
substantial period of time. Id. at 242 (noting that Congress was concerned with long-term activity). 
Where this cannot be proved, there must be a threat of continuity (i.e. open-ended continuity). This is a 
fact-sensitive determination, and can be either explicit or implicit. Id.  
 The Court found that Congress was concerned with long-term criminal conduct. Id. at 242. And 
that predicate offenses ―extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal 
conduct do not satisfy [the continuity requirement].‖ Id. This is not to say that predicate offenses 
occurring close together in time cannot show continuity. In such a case, the predicate offenses may 
―include a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future, and thus supply the 
requisite threat of continuity.‖ Id.  
 Continuity may also be established where (1) the defendant operates as part of a long-term 
criminal enterprise (including organized crime groups), or (2) the offenses are a regular way of 
conducting an ongoing legitimate business. Id. at 243. 
 33. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239–40 (referring to Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, Pub. 
L. No. 91-452, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922, 948–50 (formerly codified under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575–3578), 
repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 
1987 (1984)). The Court was referring to subsection (e) of § 3575. 
 34. Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922, 950. 
 35. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243. The Court did take time to reject the argument that a RICO pattern 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the facts of the case, the Court easily found a possible relationship. The 
acts committed by Northwestern Bell were said to be related by the 
common purpose of influencing MPUC officials to approve unreasonable 
rates.
36
 
B. Pattern and Relatedness in the Second Circuit 
Only five months prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in H.J. Inc., 
the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, decided United States v. Indelicato.
37
 
In Indelicato, the Second Circuit made a lengthy review of its prior 
precedent in an attempt to clarify the meaning of a ―pattern of racketeering 
activity.‖38 At the time, the controlling precedent in the Second Circuit 
was United States v. Ianniello,
39
 which had held that Sedima‘s footnote 
fourteen ―continuity plus relationship‖ applied to the enterprise 
requirement,
40
 and that two predicate offenses were sufficient to establish 
a pattern.
41
 Indelicato overruled Ianniello on both issues, holding that two 
predicate offenses alone are not sufficient to establish a pattern, and that 
―continuity plus relationship‖ applied to the pattern requirement of 
§ 1962(c), rather than the enterprise requirement.
42
 The court also 
reasoned that predicate offenses not directly related to each other could 
nonetheless be indirectly related if they were related to the enterprise.
43
 
 
 
requires an organized crime limitation. Id. at 243–44. This argument is based on the belief that RICO 
was solely intended to eradicate organized crime. Id. The Court found nothing in the language of 
RICO or its legislative history that indicated Congress had such a limitation in mind. Id. at 244. 
 36. Id. at 250. 
 37. 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 38. Id. at 1373–80. 
 39. 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 40. Id. at 190 (―[R]elatedness is supplied by the concept of ‗enterprise‘. . . . This also supplies the 
necessary element of continuity, since an enterprise is a continuing operation.‖). 
 41. Id. at 192 (―[W]e hold that when a person commits at least two acts that have the common 
purpose of furthering a continuing criminal enterprise with which that person is associated, the 
elements of relatedness and continuity . . . are satisfied.‖). 
 42. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1382. At the same time that the Second Circuit overruled Ianniello, it 
declined to hold that an earlier case stood for the proposition that two predicate offenses alone could 
constitute a pattern. Id. (considering United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980)). In 
Weisman, the defendant argued that the jury instruction was erroneous because the term ―pattern of 
racketeering‖ implicitly requires a showing of relationship between the predicate offenses. Weisman, 
624 F.2d at 1121. The Weisman court rejected this argument. Id. at 1122. Part of its reasoning included 
the fact that the enterprise itself provides a link between the offenses. Id. 
 43. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383 (―In some cases . . . relatedness . . . may be proven through the 
nature of the RICO enterprise. . . . [T]wo racketeering acts that are not directly related to each other 
may nevertheless be related indirectly because each is related to the RICO enterprise.‖). Indirect 
relation is when interrelationship between predicate offenses (horizontal relatedness) is proven through 
evidence of their relation to the enterprise (vertical relatedness). See Part IV for a more detailed 
discussion and critique of this principle. 
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The next year, in United States v. Long,
44
 the Second Circuit first used 
the terms ―horizontal relatedness‖ and ―vertical relatedness.‖45 The court 
explained that horizontal relatedness refers to the interrelationship between 
predicate offenses, and that vertical relatedness refers to the relationship of 
the predicate acts to the enterprise.
46
 In Long, the defendants‘ trial 
occurred before Indelicato was decided, and the jury instruction did not 
reflect the change in the law.
47
 The Second Circuit reversed the 
convictions because it was unclear whether the jury could have found the 
predicate offenses horizontally related.
48
 
Next, in United States v. Minicone,
49
 the Second Circuit elaborated its 
vertical and horizontal relatedness requirements. Citing Indelicato, it 
explained that horizontal relatedness includes not only direct relatedness 
between predicate offenses, but also indirect relatedness
50
 if each offense 
is related to the enterprise.
51
 Vertical relatedness is established if the 
predicate offenses are related to the activities of the enterprise, but can 
also be shown if the defendant was able to commit the offenses ―solely by 
virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the 
affairs of the enterprise.‖52  
In United States v. Polanco, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its reasoning 
in Minicone.
53
 However, it made a significant simplification of the 
 
 
 44. 917 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 45. Id. at 697 (―Under Indelicato and H.J. Inc., therefore, the government must prove that two 
racketeering acts were related to each other (‗horizontal‘ relatedness) as well as related to the 
enterprise (‗vertical‘ relatedness) . . . .‖). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 696. 
 48. Id. at 697–98 (―A pattern instruction containing the horizontal relatedness element was 
critical in the instant matter.‖). But see United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 553 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(Ianniello instruction did not rise to level of plain error because substantial evidence that predicate 
offenses were related to one another). 
 49. 960 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 50. As discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, indirect relation is the use of vertical relatedness to 
establish horizontal relatedness.  
 51. Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106; see also United States v. Dinome, 954 F.2d 839, 843 (2d Cir. 
1992) (quoting Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383–84). In Dinome, the defendants argued that there was 
spillover prejudice from the admission of evidence of crimes committed by other members of the 
enterprise. The Second Circuit held it was not prejudicial because ―it tended to prove: (i) the existence 
and nature of the RICO enterprise and (ii) a pattern of racketeering activity on the part of each 
defendant by providing the requisite relationship and continuity of illegal activities.‖ Dinome, 954 
F.2d at 843. Thus, the court was allowing evidence of crimes committed by other people to prove the 
nature of the enterprise, which could then be used through indirect relation to prove relatedness 
between the defendants‘ predicate offenses. See supra note 43. 
 52. Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106 (quoting United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1987)) 
(emphasis and quotation marks omitted). 
 53. United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 541 (2d Cir. 1998) (―A predicate act is related to a 
different predicate act if each predicate act is related to the enterprise.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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definitions. Under Polanco, ―[a] predicate act is ‗related‘ to an enterprise 
if it is ‗related to the activities of that enterprise,‘‖ and ―is related to a 
different predicate act if each predicate act is related to the enterprise.‖54  
The Second Circuit‘s most recent pronouncement on the vertical and 
horizontal relatedness elements came in United States v. Daidone.
55
 In that 
case, the court synthesized its prior precedent with H.J. Inc.
56
 It noted that 
H.J. Inc. was not to be given a narrow reading, and the factors given in 
that case were merely a starting point to the relationship inquiry.
57
 While 
reasoning that horizontal and vertical relatedness elements provide a limit 
on RICO liability, the court placed great emphasis on the common overlap 
in proof for the two elements.
58
 As the court stated, this overlap exists 
―because predicate crimes will share common goals (increasing and 
protecting the financial position of the enterprise) and common victims 
(e.g., those who threaten its goals), and will draw their participants from 
the same pool of associates (those who are members and associates of the 
enterprise).‖59  
II. WHY HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL REALTEDNESS ARE LOGICAL 
As stated in Daidone, the purpose of having horizontal and vertical 
relatedness elements is to place an outer limit on RICO liability.
60
 
Predicate offenses may be horizontally or vertically related, yet still 
isolated. Requiring proof of both, however, guards against such isolated 
crimes, which the Court has said do not constitute a ―pattern.‖61 Allowing 
the prosecution to prove horizontal relatedness by showing that the 
 
 
 54. Id. (citing Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106). But see United States v. Amato, 86 F. App‘x 447, 
450 (2d Cir. 2004) (using Minicone‘s two possible options for proving vertical relatedness); United 
States v. Mason, 2001 WL 69442, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2001) (finding horizontal relatedness 
because of ―similarity of victims, participants, locations, and purposes‖). For a criticism of the way the 
Second Circuit defines and applies the vertical and horizontal relatedness elements, see Barry Tarlow, 
RICO Report, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1998, at 37, 37–42 (―[T]he Polanco court defined horizontal and 
vertical relatedness in exactly the same way . . . . The Polanco court thus eliminated any distinction 
between horizontal and vertical relatedness.‖). 
 55. 471 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 56. Id. at 375–76 (looking to H.J. Inc., Indelicato, Minicone, and Polanco). 
 57. Id. at 375. 
 58. Id. at 376. Specifically, the court stated, ―Requiring inquiries into horizontal and vertical 
relatedness places limits on the outer reach of RICO liability. The necessity of proving such 
relationships, however, does not prohibit a RICO conviction merely because it is formed on a pattern 
of racketeering activity proven by overlapping evidence tending to establish proof satisfying both 
inquiries.‖ Id. 
 59. Id. at 376 (noting that overlapping evidence ―is a familiar phenomenon in RICO cases‖). 
 60. Id. at 376. 
 61. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). 
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predicate acts are related to the enterprise effectively negates the 
horizontal element by erasing the line between horizontal and vertical 
relatedness.
62
 This practice contradicts the purpose stated in Daidone by 
removing the limit imposed by distinct horizontal and vertical elements. 
Distinct horizontal and vertical elements are not only a desirable barrier 
to RICO conviction, but also flow directly from the words of RICO and 
the decision in H.J. Inc. In order to demonstrate this, it is necessary to first 
establish why the Supreme Court‘s elaboration in H.J. Inc. was a 
permissible interpretation. 
A. The Logic of H.J. Inc. 
A pattern of racketeering activity ―requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity . . . the last of which occurred within ten years . . . 
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.‖63 As the 
Supreme Court noted, this definition only sets the minimum number of 
acts that could possibly satisfy the requirement, but requires something 
more than two predicate offenses.
64
 The definition and the term ―pattern‖ 
itself use language that does not readily explain its meaning.
65
 As is its 
customary practice, the Court looked to the dictionary for the ordinary 
meaning of ―pattern,‖ which stated that ―[a] pattern is an ‗arrangement or 
order of things or activity.‘‖66 So a pattern of racketeering activity is an 
arrangement or order of racketeering activity. This articulation, however, 
merely begs the question: what is it that arranges or orders two acts of 
racketeering so that they constitute a pattern? As the Court correctly 
reasoned, it is not the number of acts alone that establish the pattern, but 
how they are related, either to each other or to some organizing principle.
67
 
But this reasoning does no more than establish that predicate acts of 
racketeering must be related to each other or to some ―organizing 
principle.‖ This is no great revelation. It is only natural to expect a 
―pattern‖ of things to have something in common that ties them all 
 
 
 62. See Tarlow, supra note 54, at 41. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006). 
 64. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238; See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.14 
(1985). 
 65. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237 (noting that Congress frequently used broad terms and 
concepts in RICO). 
 66. Id. at 238 (quoting 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (James A. H. Murray et al. eds., 
2d ed. 1989)). 
 67. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238. 
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together.
68
 This leads to the question, what factors should a court look to 
in determining whether predicate offenses are related for RICO purposes? 
To answer this question, the Court chose to look to another section of 
the OCCA,
69
 the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act.
70
 This act 
defined a pattern in terms of the relationship between criminal acts.
71
 
There is a pattern if the conduct ―embraces criminal acts that have the 
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of 
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics 
and are not isolated events.‖72 Although Justice Scalia disagreed with this 
step,
73
 it was a logical one to take. Faced with broad statutory language, 
the Court examined the context of RICO by referring to another statute 
enacted at the same time.
74
 The Court was making an effort to provide 
direction for lower courts in RICO cases.
75
 Consequently, the ―continuity 
plus relationship‖ test was a permissible interpretation by the Court 
engaging in its usual statutory construction. 
If the ―continuity plus relationship‖ test was a permissible 
interpretation for the Court to make, then it was necessary to define what 
is meant by ―relationship.‖ The Court chose to incorporate a definition 
written by Congress in a contemporary section of the OCCA, rather than 
invent its own. Thus, the Court‘s elaboration of what relationship means in 
the context of a RICO pattern was a permissible and logical interpretation. 
Not only was this interpretation permissible, but it was also desirable. 
The Court was faced not only with differing interpretations from the 
 
 
 68. This line of reasoning is not as easy to apply to the continuity prong of the test. In common 
usage, the term pattern does not bring to mind the temporal aspect that continuity represents. However, 
the legislative history allowed the Supreme Court to make the logical connection between RICO‘s 
pattern element and continuity. See id. at 239, 242 (―Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term 
criminal conduct.‖). 
 69. Id. at 239. 
 70. Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922, 
948–50 (1970). 
 71. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240. 
 72. Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922, 950. The language 
comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), which has been repealed. 
 73. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated, ―Unfortunately, if 
normal (and sensible) rules of statutory construction were followed, the existence of § 3575(e)-which 
is the definition contained in another title of the Act that was explicitly not rendered applicable to 
RICO-suggests that whatever ‗pattern‘ might mean in RICO, it assuredly does not mean that.‖ Id. 
 74. This is arguably a better practice than looking to wholly different titles of the United States 
Code, or to statutes enacted at different times.  
 75. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236 (―[A]s the plethora of different views expressed by the Courts 
of Appeals . . . demonstrates, . . . developing a meaningful concept of ‗pattern‘ within the existing 
statutory framework has proved to be no easy task.‖). 
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Courts of Appeals, but also with a lack of development from Congress.
76
 
In the thirty-seven years since RICO was enacted, Congress has only 
amended § 1962 once.
77
 Indeed, Congress has implicitly approved of the 
expansive readings the courts have given to RICO‘s broad language.78 
This lack of action on the part of Congress leads to the conclusion that any 
limit which is to be put on RICO must come from the courts.
79
 With this 
understanding of the need for judicial interpretation, and the Court‘s logic 
in H.J. Inc., it becomes clear that the Second Circuit took the next logical 
step.
80
  
The upside to the broad language of RICO is that it provides leeway for 
judicial interpretation. When a statute defines a broad term such as 
―pattern‖ only by indicating a minimum number of predicate offenses, it 
cannot be argued that courts should not be allowed to impose logical 
definitions. H.J. Inc. represents such an effort. However, in H.J. Inc. the 
Court itself noted that ―[t]he development of these concepts must await 
 
 
 76. Id. at 236 (―Congress has done nothing . . . further [since the Sedima decision] to illuminate 
RICO‘s key requirement of a pattern of racketeering . . . .‖). 
 77. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7033, 102 Stat. 4181, 4398 (1988) 
(substituting ―subsection‖ for ―subsections‖ in § 1962(d)). At the time of H.J. Inc., RICO had been in 
force for almost two decades. 
 78. Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 712–13 (―If RICO has evolved into something different 
from what Congress intended at its creation, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Congress has 
looked at what has evolved, and pronounced it good.‖). The Court has noted ―that RICO is to be 
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.‖ Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
498 (1985) (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 79. Many commentators have advocated for legislative action to replace or reform RICO. See, 
e.g., Lisa Barsoomian, RICO “Pattern” Before and After H.J. Inc.: A Proposed Definition, 40 AM. U. 
L. REV. 919, 953–55 (1991) (proposing to redefine ―pattern of racketeering activity‖); Lynch (pts. 3 & 
4), supra note 7, at 971–77 (arguing that RICO be replaced by a series of smaller statutes); Terrance G. 
Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 711–14 (1990) (emphasizing need 
for reform and criticizing congressional reform efforts); R. Stephen Stigall, Comment, Preventing 
Absurd Application of RICO: A Proposed Amendment to Congress’s Definition of “Racketeering 
Activity” in the Wake of National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 223, 
245–48 (1995) (arguing for reduction of list of predicate offenses in context of civil RICO). However, 
in light of the lack of amendments to § 1962(c) it seems that Congress is unlikely to heed such calls. 
Therefore, the only alternatives are judicial interpretations and prosecutorial abstention. See 
Barsoomian, at 920 (―A liberal construction of the statute‘s broad language means not only that the 
discretion to invoke RICO remains with prosecutors . . . , but also that the courts must define RICO‘s 
scope and prevent its abuse.‖). However, the adaptability and breadth of RICO make it attractive to 
prosecutors who can make creative claims. See Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 662 (―[P]rosecutors 
have seized on the virtually unlimited sweep of the language of RICO to bring a wide variety of 
different prosecutions in the form of RICO indictments.‖). 
 80. See Tarlow, supra note 54, at 37 (―The relationship of racketeering acts to each other can 
best be described as ‗horizontal relatedness,‘ while the relationship of racketeering acts to the 
enterprise can best be described as ‗vertical relatedness.‘‖) (citing United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 
1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1504 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:1493 
 
 
 
 
future cases . . . .‖81 Thus, the Court expressly authorized further 
development by the lower courts. The Second Circuit‘s horizontal and 
vertical relatedness elements are just such a development. 
B. Horizontal Relatedness 
Horizontal relatedness can be seen as entirely consistent with the 
decision in H.J. Inc. Horizontal relatedness is nothing more than H.J. 
Inc.‘s definition of ―relationship.‖82 Indeed, the Court in H.J. Inc. was 
concerned with the interrelationship between predicate offenses.
83
 When 
determining whether predicate offenses have similar ―purposes, results, 
participants, victims, or methods of commission,‖ a court is investigating 
how those acts are connected to each other.
84
 For example, a group of 
criminals associating together to commit arson
85
 in exchange for money 
can demonstrate these factors. Each act of arson has the purpose of making 
money for the group, results in the destruction by fire of buildings, 
includes the members of the group as participants in each act, and uses the 
lighting of a fire as the method of commission. Each act of arson 
committed by the group is thus related to the other acts. 
An argument can be made that the Second Circuit did not have H.J. 
Inc. in mind when it elaborated the horizontal relatedness element. Early 
cases in that circuit using the term ―horizontal relatedness‖ only 
mentioned H.J. Inc. in passing, and only cited it for the ―continuity plus 
relationship‖ test.86 However, many of these early cases relied on the 
 
 
 81. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243. 
 82. See United States v. Muyet, 994 F. Supp. 501, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (defining horizontal 
relatedness with H.J. Inc.‘s list of factors); see also United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 375 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (discussing H.J. Inc. factors in context of defendant‘s horizontal relatedness argument). The 
defendant in Daidone made this very argument. Daidone, 471 F.3d at 374. However, the court rejected 
the argument, relying on the principle of indirect relation as discussed in Polanco and Minicone. Id. at 
375 (―Accordingly, the requirements of horizontal relatedness can be established by linking each 
predicate act to the enterprise . . . .‖). 
 83. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238, 240. 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 51 F. App‘x 355, 357 (2d Cir. 2002) (predicate offenses 
both involved robbing from drug dealers by members of the enterprise); Muyet, 994 F. Supp. at 509–
10 (discussing similarity of participants, purpose, and victims among the thirteen predicate acts 
charged).  
 85. Arson is a predicate offense for purposes of RICO if it ―is chargeable under State law and 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year . . . .‖ 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2006). Assume for 
this example and following examples that the acts committed by the arson ring meet these 
requirements. 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing H.J. Inc. as part of 
string citation); United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting H.J. Inc. for 
―continuity plus relationship‖ test). More recently, the Second Circuit has cited H.J. Inc. for its 
relationship factors. Daidone, 471 F.3d at 375. See Part IV for a discussion of why the Second 
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decision in Indelicato.
87
 In that case, the Second Circuit relied on the exact 
same provision of the OCCA that the Supreme Court later looked to for 
help in defining relationship.
88
 Thus, the list of factors approved by the 
Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. was already in place in the Second Circuit 
when it developed the horizontal relatedness element.  
C. Vertical Relatedness 
Vertical relatedness requires that the predicate offenses be related to 
the RICO enterprise.
89
 Although the same argument cannot be made that 
this element stems from H.J. Inc., the statute itself implicitly requires this 
type of relationship.
90
 For RICO liability to attach under § 1962(c), a 
person must ―conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct 
of [a RICO] enterprise‘s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity 
. . . .‖91 If one is conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of 
activity, then the acts which constitute the pattern have to be the vehicle 
through which the affairs of the enterprise are carried on.
92
 If there is no 
connection between the predicate offenses and the enterprise, there would 
be no reason to attach federal criminal liability. 
This interpretation is supported by the legislative intent behind the 
enactment of RICO. Congress was primarily concerned with criminal 
groups that used racketeering acts to infiltrate legitimate businesses.
93
 It 
was the use of such tactics to achieve the goal of infiltration that justified 
the imposition of federal criminal liability.
94
 The addition of subsection (c) 
 
 
Circuit‘s development of the horizontal relatedness element has not been entirely faithful to H.J. Inc.  
 87. See, e.g., Long, 917 F.2d at 697; United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 551 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106. 
 88. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1382 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3575(e)). 
 89. See Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106 (stating predicate offenses ―must be related to the enterprise 
(‗vertical‘ relatedness)‖); Daidone, 471 F.3d at 375 (quoting this language). 
 90. See Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1384; see also Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of 
the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 665 (1990) (―[E]ach of the three substantive RICO 
offenses requires a specific nexus between the racketeering acts and the enterprise. Therefore, RICO 
already has a built-in ‗relationship‘ requirement.‖). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 92. See Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1384 (―[F]or each of the substantive RICO subsections prohibits a 
specific type of interplay between a pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise.‖). 
 93. See Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 676 (describing views of Sen. Hruska in a precursor 
bill that would eventually become RICO). 
 94. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76–78 (1969) (―Obviously, the time has come for a frontal attack on 
the subversion of our economic system by organized criminal activities. That attack must begin, 
however, with the frank recognition that our present laws are inadequate to remove criminal influences 
from legitimate endeavor organizations.‖). 
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to the original bill allowed prosecution of those who continued to carry on 
the affairs of the infiltrated business through the use of racketeering acts.
95
 
Thus, it is not merely the fact that predicate offenses are committed, but 
that they relate to what the enterprise is trying to accomplish.
96
  
The implicit requirement of vertical relatedness in § 1962 is even more 
apparent where the enterprise is wholly criminal. The whole business of 
these ―associated in fact‖ enterprises is to commit crimes.97 The only way 
that the affairs of a wholly criminal enterprise can be conducted is through 
committing crimes. And the persons who commit the crimes necessarily 
participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise.
98
  
In discussing this element, the Second Circuit established that vertical 
relatedness can be found if the defendant ―was enabled to commit the 
predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or 
involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise . . . .‖99 This is a 
logical extension of the words of the statute. If a defendant was able to 
commit an offense solely because he was a member of an enterprise, then 
it is his participation in the affairs of the enterprise
100
 which enabled him 
to commit that offense. For example, assume that the arson ring from the 
previous example was known to exclusively control an area of New York 
 
 
 95. Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 682. 
 96. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1384 (―[N]o RICO violation can be shown unless there is proof of the 
specified relationship between the racketeering acts and the RICO enterprise.‖). 
 97. See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991) (―The business of a 
criminal enterprise is crime.‖). 
 98. Though it seems that this would lead to the conclusion that horizontal relatedness is not 
necessary in the case of associated in fact enterprises, this is not true. A person is not guilty of 
violating RICO for merely participating in the commission of crimes which constitute the affairs of the 
enterprise. The participation must form a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). 
And it follows from H.J. Inc. that a ―pattern of racketeering activity‖ requires interrelatedness between 
the predicate offenses. See Part II.B. 
 99. United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. 
Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 947–48 (2d Cir. 1987)) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted); see also 
United States v. Muyet, 994 F. Supp. 501, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (―[T]he gang did not simply allow 
anyone to commit [murder], only those close associates who had earned the trust of the group.‖). 
 Predicate offenses are also vertically related to an enterprise if they are ―related to the activities of 
that enterprise.‖ Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Amato, 86 F. App‘x 447, 450 (2d Cir. 2004) (activities 
of enterprise included criminal acts undertaken to gain confidence and respect of other members). This 
is fairly intuitive and needs no extended discussion. For example, if a member of a narcotics 
trafficking enterprise launders the proceeds of its drug sales, it is unquestionable that the money 
laundering is related to the activities of the enterprise. The money that is laundered comes from the 
major activity of the enterprise: drug trafficking. And the purpose in laundering the money is to 
conceal the source of the money. However, the Second Circuit has said that the predicate act need not 
be in furtherance of the enterprise to be related to the activities of the enterprise. See United States v. 
Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 815 (2d Cir. 1994); Muyet, 994 F. Supp. at 509. 
 100. Under § 1962(c), a person associated with a RICO enterprise is proscribed from conducting 
or participating in the affairs of that enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
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City. Within its territory, any acts of arson were committed by that ring. If 
a member of the arson ring set fire to a building within that territory, he 
could only commit that specific act of arson because he was a member of 
the ring. Likewise, if the defendant was able to commit the offense 
because of his involvement in, or control over, the affairs of the enterprise, 
then the offense is vertically related to the affairs of the enterprise because 
the enterprise provided an opportunity which otherwise would not exist.  
Also, if the defendant exercises control over the affairs of the 
enterprise, his position allows him to draw on resources that he would 
otherwise not have. Assume the leader of the arson ring is commissioned 
to commit an act of arson that requires a group of people working in 
concert. Further assume that he was approached because of the reputation 
of his group for excellence in the field of arson. If he was simply an 
individual arsonist, he would not have been approached. His position as 
leader of the arson ring, which allowed him to marshal the forces of the 
other members, gave him the opportunity to commit the offense which 
otherwise would not have existed. That act of arson is therefore related to 
the arson ring enterprise. 
The Second Circuit‘s elaboration of the horizontal and vertical 
relatedness elements was a logical extension from the words of § 1962(c) 
and the decision in H.J. Inc. Furthermore, in taking this step the Second 
Circuit was obeying the Supreme Court‘s express authorization to further 
interpret the ―continuity plus relationship‖ test.101  
III. RELATEDNESS ON OTHER CIRCUITS
102
 
In analyzing relatedness, a majority of circuits simply use the list of 
factors from H.J. Inc. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits find that predicate offenses are related 
if they share ―similar purposes, results, victims, or methods of 
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
 
 
 101. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989) (―The development of these 
concepts must await future cases, absent a decision by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer 
guidance as to the Act‘s intended scope.‖). 
 102. For further reading on pattern and relatedness in other circuits, see Bagley, supra note 5, at 
907–10. The cases cited by the Bagley article include the following: United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 
752, 761–62 (8th Cir. 2006); N. Bridge Assocs. v. Boldt, 274 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001); Howard v. 
Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 626 
(D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. To, 144 F.3d 737, 747 (11th Cir. 1998); Edmondson & Gallagher v. 
Alban Towers Tenants Ass‘n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 
1294 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 703 (6th Cir. 1994). 
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characteristics.‖103 The Third and Sixth Circuits are similar to the Second 
in that they allow interrelationship between predicate offenses to be 
proved by showing that the predicate offenses are related to the 
enterprise.
104
 
The majority of circuits are correct in using the list of factors in H.J. 
Inc. This is not to say that these circuits do not require that predicate 
offenses be related to the enterprise. There is still the inherent requirement 
that the predicate offenses have a vertical nexus to the enterprise.
105
 In 
reality, these courts are still determining whether the predicate offenses 
exhibit both horizontal and vertical relatedness.
106
 The advantage of the 
Second Circuit‘s method is that these requirements are expressly 
identified. As discussed in Part II.B, horizontal relatedness is required by 
the decision in H.J. Inc. The requirement of vertical relatedness, however, 
 
 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007); Hively, 437 F.3d at 
761; United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 
71, 88 (1st Cir. 2004); N. Bridge Assocs., 274 F.3d at 42; W. Assocs. Ltd. P‘ship, ex rel. Ave. Assocs. 
Ltd. P‘ship v. Mkt. Square Assocs., 235 F.3d 629, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Howard, 208 F.3d at 749; 
Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, Educ. & Employment of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 505–06 
(4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 669 (8th Cir. 1998); Corley v. Rosewood Care 
Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1998); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Grammco Computer Sales, Inc., 71 
F.3d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 661 (7th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 440 (4th 
Cir. 1993). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 292 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 554 (6th Cir. 2000) (―The predicate acts do not necessarily need to be directly 
interrelated; they must, however, be connected to the affairs and operations of the criminal 
enterprise.‖); United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 566 (3d Cir. 1991) (―[S]eparately performed, 
functionally diverse and directly unrelated predicate acts and offenses will form a pattern under RICO, 
as long as they all have been undertaken in furtherance of one or another varied purposes of a common 
organized crime enterprise.‖).  
 The Sixth Circuit adopted its reasoning from a Second Circuit case, United States v. Locascio, 6 
F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir. 1993). In Corrado, the Sixth Circuit stated, ―We adopt the holding in a 
somewhat similar organized-crime case on the relatedness question: ‗[T]he relatedness requirement 
can be satisfied by proof that: (1) the defendant was enabled to commit the offense solely by virtue of 
his position in the enterprise; or (2) the offense was related to the activities of the enterprise.‘‖ 
Corrado, 227 F.3d at 554 (quoting Locascio). However, the court was confused on this point, because 
the language it adopted is used in the Second Circuit in reference to vertical relatedness. See Minicone, 
960 F.2d at 1106. Properly viewed, the element that the court was trying to establish was horizontal 
relatedness.  
 Allowing interrelationship to be proved by showing the predicate offenses are related to the 
enterprise is indirect relation. For further discussion on the concept of indirect relation, see Part IV.  
 105. See, e.g., Smith, 413 F.3d at 1272 (―In a RICO prosecution, the Government must prove a 
relationship between the racketeering activity and the enterprise.‖); United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 
11, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (―It is clear that by using the word ‗through,‘ Congress intended some 
connection between the defendant‘s predicate acts and the enterprise.‖).  
 106. See Tarlow, supra note 54, at 37 (―The relationship of racketeering acts to each other can 
best be described as ‗horizontal relatedness,‘ while the relationship of racketeering acts to the 
enterprise can best be described as ‗vertical relatedness.‘‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2009] CRIMINAL RELATIONSHIPS 1509 
 
 
 
 
is discerned by considering the structure of § 1962(c). In order to 
―conduct‖ a RICO enterprise ―through‖ a pattern of racketeering activity, 
the predicate acts must be the means by which the enterprise‘s affairs are 
carried out.
107
 To determine the existence of vertical relatedness, the 
Second Circuit has evolved a separate test.
108
 Express identification of the 
two elements thus allows for a more substantive analysis of the sufficiency 
of the evidence adduced as proof, and establishes another safeguard 
against unwarranted prosecution under RICO. Part IV considers how the 
protections thus established are undermined by the Second Circuit‘s use of 
indirect relation.  
The Third and Sixth Circuits fall into the same trap as the Second 
Circuit. As discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, allowing the relation of 
a predicate offense to the enterprise to prove its relationship with other 
predicate offenses is the practice of indirect relation. This practice erases 
the distinction between the interrelationship between predicate offenses 
themselves (horizontal relatedness) and the nexus between predicate 
offenses and the enterprise (vertical relatedness). It is also unfaithful to the 
Supreme Court‘s pronouncement of the ―continuity plus relationship‖ test 
in H.J. Inc.
109
  
 
 
 107. See Randy D. Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice: A Reexamination of RICO’s Nexus 
Requirements Under 18 U.S.C §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c), 32 VT. L. REV. 171, 174 (2007). Gordon draws 
a distinction between the approach taken by the Second Circuit (in which horizontal relatedness 
requires interrelationship between predicate acts and vertical relatedness requires that the acts be 
related to the enterprise), and the approach that horizontal relatedness satisfies the ―pattern‖ 
requirement, while vertical relatedness satisfies the ―conduct‖ requirement. Id. He states: 
The second approach, or test, seems the sounder of the two for two reasons. First, it accords 
with the common meaning of ―pattern,‖ which connotes a physical relationship of elements—
e.g., thread or yarn—coming together to form a recognizable graphic. Second, the question of 
whether acts relate to an enterprise permits an end-run around the standard established in 
H.J., Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. . . . . 
Id. This distinction, however, is somewhat misleading. As discussed in Part II.C, the Second Circuit‘s 
vertical relatedness requirement is a product of the language of § 1962(c). Therefore, the two 
approaches identified by Gordon are the same. The ―end-run around‖ that he identifies is simply the 
problem considered in this Note: the erroneous practice of ―indirect relation‖ to prove horizontal 
relatedness. Id. at 174–75 (citing United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536 (2d Cir. 1998) and Tarlow, 
supra note 54). 
 108. Vertical relatedness exists if the defendant ―was enabled to commit the predicate offenses 
solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the 
enterprise . . . .‖ Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106 (quoting United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 947–48 
(2d Cir. 1987)) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted). 
 109. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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IV. SECOND CIRCUIT ERRORS: INCONSISTENCY AND INDIRECT RELATION 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Second Circuit has engaged in a 
permissible act of interpretation in formulating the horizontal and vertical 
relatedness elements, its application of those elements has been 
inconsistent and self-defeating.
110
 In Long, the court reversed the 
defendant‘s RICO conviction because the jury instruction failed to require 
a finding of horizontal relatedness.
111
 However, in Minicone the court 
affirmed a RICO conviction for one of the defendants, even though the 
evidence of relationship between the predicate offenses was ―tenuous.‖112 
In Polanco, the court explicitly stated that predicate offenses are related to 
each other if each is related to the enterprise.
113
 But this definition erases 
the line between horizontal and vertical relatedness. In fact, one 
commentator has criticized the holding in Polanco for this very reason.
114
 
The glaring error that the Second Circuit has committed is the reliance 
on indirect relation utilized in the Polanco decision. Indirect relation 
occurs when the interrelationship between predicate offenses (horizontal 
relatedness) is proved through evidence of their relation to the enterprise 
(vertical relatedness). This practice has its roots in the Second Circuit‘s 
decision in Indelicato,
115
 and was accepted and emphasized in later 
 
 
 110. See Tarlow, supra note 54, at 41. Another area of confusion in the Second Circuit seems to 
be whether the pattern requirement applies to a collection of unlawful debt. One case has held that 
―[u]nlike a pattern of racketeering activity which requires proof of two or more predicate acts, to 
satisfy RICO‘s collection of unlawful debt definition the government need only demonstrate a single 
collection.‖ United States v. Giovanelli, 945 F.2d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also, United States v. Megale, 363 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364 n.5 (D. Conn. 2005) (―Where the 
government need only prove one collection of an unlawful debt, it would not be logical to require the 
government to prove that this single act is related to other predicate acts.‖). However, only four 
months later, the court found that a defendant‘s collection of unlawful debt combined with his 
extortion activities formed the requisite pattern. Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1108. If a single instance of 
collection of unlawful debt is sufficient for a RICO conviction, it would seem there would be no need 
to discuss it in the context of a pattern. It seems that a final resolution of this issue will be found in a 
discussion of statutory construction. However, this is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 111. United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 698 (2d Cir. 1990) (―A pattern instruction containing 
the horizontal relatedness element was critical in the instant matter.‖). 
 112. Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1107. The court looked to the nature of the RICO enterprise, and the 
connection of the predicate offenses to the enterprise. Id. 
 113. United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 541 (2d Cir. 1998). It is worth noting that the 
defendant in Polanco was charged with seven predicate offenses, only one of which he argued was not 
related to the others. While it seems that in this context the court‘s definition of horizontal relatedness 
is non-determinative, it is still illustrative of the Second Circuit‘s inconsistent application of the 
elements.  
 114. Tarlow, supra note 54, at 41. 
 115. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989) (―[T]wo racketeering acts 
that are not directly related to each other may nevertheless be related indirectly because each is related 
to the RICO enterprise.‖). 
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decisions.
116
 This practice has the effect of allowing the prosecution to 
convict a defendant without meeting the Supreme Court‘s definition of 
relatedness in H.J. Inc.
117
 Indirect relation is simply vertical relatedness 
under a different name.
118
 
The Second Circuit‘s adherence to this practice, established by a 
decision that predates H.J. Inc., is unfaithful to that decision. Faced with a 
divergence in the Courts of Appeals as to the meaning of the term ―pattern 
of racketeering activity,‖119 the Supreme Court established a uniform test. 
 
 
 116. See Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1106; Polanco, 145 F.3d at 541; United States v. Daidone, 471 
F.3d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2006). It is interesting to note that the theory of indirect relation was explicitly 
rejected by the Second Circuit in a post-Indelicato case. United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 697 (2d 
Cir. 1990). In Long, the defendant was convicted after the jury was given an instruction under the 
Second Circuit‘s pre-Indelicato precedent. Id. at 696. That instruction required only that the acts be 
related to the activities of the enterprise, but they did not have to relate to each other. Id. On appeal, 
the government argued that since the jury had to find that the predicate offenses were related to the 
enterprise, the jury necessarily had to find that they were interrelated. Id. at 697. This is precisely the 
reasoning that is used to justify indirect relation. The court was quite straightforward in its rejection. 
―This plainly did not satisfy the Indelicato requirements of proof of both ‗horizontal relatedness‘ and 
threat of continuity of criminal activity.‖ Id. Somewhat fittingly, Long is the first case to use the terms 
―horizontal‖ and ―vertical‖ relatedness. 
 117. This is not to say that federal prosecutors will jump at the opportunity to bring RICO charges 
under the relaxed relatedness requirements of the Second Circuit. The United States Attorneys‘ 
Manual specifically states that ―No RICO criminal indictment or information . . . shall be filed . . . 
without the prior approval of the Criminal Division.‖ UNITED STATES DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, § 9-110.101 (1999) [hereinafter USAM], available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_ room/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm. Approval is not automatic. 
Rather, ―not every proposed RICO charge that meets the technical requirements of a RICO violation 
will be approved. Further, the Criminal Division will not approve ‗imaginative‘ prosecutions under 
RICO which are far afield from the congressional purpose of the RICO statute.‖ Id. § 9-110.200. The 
manual also states that it is inappropriate to charge RICO merely for use as a bargaining tool for later 
plea bargaining on lesser counts. Id. § 9-110.320; see also Dennis, supra note 90, at 671–72 (strongly 
emphasizing that RICO courts are not used for leverage in plea negotiations). The manual also gives a 
list of considerations, which are termed ―requirements,‖ before seeking approval for a RICO charge. 
However, only one of these considerations need be present. USAM, § 9-110.310. And it must be 
remembered that ―[t]hese guidelines provide only internal Department of Justice guidance.‖ Id. § 9-
110.200. 
 This Note does not argue that the Department of Justice abuses its prosecutorial power by 
bringing unfounded RICO charges. The issue under consideration is whether current Second Circuit 
practice allows RICO defendants to be convicted without satisfying all of the required elements. 
Specifically, the Second Circuit‘s use of indirect relation does not satisfy H.J. Inc’s definition of 
relationship. So the error is not inherently due to the decisions made by federal prosecutors. Rather, 
bad cases are made permissible by the law of the circuit. Prosecutorial abuse of RICO may exist, but 
the issue is outside the scope of this Note. For competing views on this issue, compare Dennis, supra 
note 90 (emphasizing internal policies of Department of Justice that limit prosecutorial abuse), with 
Earle A. Partington, RICO, Merger, and Double Jeopardy, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 17–25 
(1991) (discussing potential for prosecutorial abuse of RICO in context of double jeopardy and 
conspiracy, and in conjunction with Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute).  
 118. See Tarlow, supra note 54, at 41. 
 119. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989). 
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This test was ―continuity plus relationship.‖120 It also set out a list of 
factors to be used when determining whether predicate offenses are 
related.
121
 As demonstrated above, the list of factors in H.J. Inc. directly 
mirrors the concept of horizontal relatedness.
122
 By allowing indirect 
relation to suffice, the Second Circuit has undermined H.J. Inc. by 
discarding horizontal relatedness in favor of vertical relatedness.
123
 
Further evidence that the practice of indirect relation is untenable can 
be seen in the treatment of ―collection of unlawful debt‖124 in the Second 
Circuit. Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court for the District of 
Connecticut have held that only a single instance of collection of unlawful 
debt need be proved to satisfy a charge under RICO.
125
 Under this view 
there are two possible ways to establish a violation of § 1962(c). The 
government can prove a ―pattern of racketeering activity‖ or ―collection of 
unlawful debt.‖ If this is a valid distinction, then the use of indirect 
relation would tend to undermine that distinction. Allowing a single 
instance of collection of unlawful debt to constitute a RICO violation 
means that horizontal relatedness to other predicate acts is not necessary. 
Only vertical relatedness to the enterprise need be shown.
126
 However, it is 
the nature of indirect relation that a ―pattern of racketeering activity‖ is 
proved by showing that the predicate offenses are all related vertically to 
the enterprise. No horizontal relation between predicate acts need be 
proved in order to establish a pattern. Thus, both a ―pattern of racketeering 
activity‖ and a ―collection of unlawful debt‖ are proved through a showing 
of vertical relation to the enterprise, and the distinction between them fails. 
Three arguments can be made that the Second Circuit‘s use of indirect 
relation is neither inconsistent with the principles underlying H.J. Inc. nor 
 
 
 120. Id. at 239. 
 121. Id. at 240. It needs to be remembered that this list of factors is non-exhaustive. The language 
quoted by the Court in H.J. Inc. includes the phrase ―or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics . . . .‖ Id. This leaves room for future courts to identify other factors that might be 
relevant to relatedness determinations. This helps RICO to retain some flexibility in order to deal with 
highly adaptable criminals. See Flowers, supra note 18, at 731. For further discussion, see infra Parts 
IV.A–B. 
 122. See supra Part II.B. 
 123. See Tarlow, supra note 54, at 40. Tarlow believes that this emphasis on vertical relatedness 
shows that the Second Circuit is relying on pre-H.J. Inc. precedent. He cites United States v. Weisman, 
624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980). Tarlow, supra note 34, at 40. The same can be said of the Second 
Circuit‘s reliance on Indelicato and its indirect relation.  
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). 
 125. See United States v. Giovanelli, 945 F.2d 479, 490 (2d. Cir. 1991) (―Unlike a ‗pattern of 
racketeering activity‘ which requires proof of two or more predicate acts, to satisfy RICO‘s ‗collection 
of unlawful debt‘ definition the government need only demonstrate a single collection.‖); United 
States v. Megale, 363 F. Supp. 2d 359, 363 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting same). 
 126. Megale, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 364 n.5. 
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the purposes behind RICO. First, the list of factors in H.J. Inc. is broad 
enough to allow this practice. Second, both H.J. Inc. and Second Circuit 
cases have emphasized the flexible nature of RICO,
127
 and eliminating 
indirect relation would replace this flexibility with rigid categories. 
Finally, RICO is meant to reach criminals that are highly adaptable.
128
 
Precluding the use of indirect relation would ossify the statute to the point 
that it could not adequately deal with these highly adaptable criminals. 
Each argument will be discussed in turn. 
A. H.J. Inc. Allows Indirect Relation 
The first argument is that the list in H.J. Inc. authorizes the use of 
indirect relation to prove horizontal relatedness.
129
 That list includes the 
possibility that predicate offenses can be ―otherwise . . . interrelated by 
distinguishing characteristics . . . .‖130 This argument is bolstered by the 
Court‘s statement that Congress‘s vision of ―relationship‖ was not a 
―constrained‖ one.131 This notion is expansive enough to include the 
relation of the predicate offenses to the enterprise (i.e. vertical relatedness) 
as the interrelating factor. Indirect relation to prove horizontal relatedness 
is therefore well within the parameters set by H.J. Inc. 
The most direct response is that this argument leads to an incongruous 
result. If all that is needed is to show that the predicate offenses are related 
to the enterprise, then there is no need to consider whether there are 
similar purposes, victims, participants, or methods of commission. In any 
 
 
 127. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (―The legislative history . . . 
shows that Congress indeed had a fairly flexible concept of pattern in mind.‖); United States v. 
Daidone, 471 F.3d 274, 375 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that Daidone‘s interpretation of the H.J. Inc. factors 
as ―specific requirements for finding horizontal relatedness distinct from vertical relatedness simply 
creates an overly formal conception of this element‖). However, the Second Circuit‘s treatment of 
―collection of unlawful debt‖ is another area in which there is inconsistency. See supra note 110. 
 128. 116 CONG. REC. 35,203 (1970) (comment of Sen. McClory) (―[The OCCA] places in the 
hands of the prosecution a number of necessary weapons in order to deal with the sophisticated 
operations of organized crime . . . .‖); Id. at 18,940 (statement of Sen. McClellan) (―Members of La 
Cosa Nostra and smaller organized crime groups are sufficiently resourceful and enterprising that one 
constantly is surprised by the variety of offenses that they commit.‖). 
 129. See Flowers, supra note 18, at 731 (―Because RICO was drafted with ‗a desire to avoid 
creating loopholes for clever defendants and their lawyers,‘ courts should be receptive to new and 
novel methods of satisfying [the relatedness] requirement.‖). Although Flowers emphasizes the 
flexibility of the relatedness requirement, he also argues that ―relationships which are purely 
coincidental, fortuitous, or inherent in all criminal acts, mark activity which is properly characterized 
as random, unorganized, and outside RICO‘s purview.‖ Id. 
 130. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240; see Flowers, supra note 18, at 731 (―Indeed, the ‗or otherwise‘ 
language of [§ 3575(e)] clearly suggests that this definition is not all encompassing.‖). 
 131. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240. 
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prosecution under subsection § 1962(c), the prosecution has to prove both 
the existence of a RICO enterprise, and the defendant‘s association with 
that enterprise.
132
 There must also be some connection between the 
predicate offenses and the enterprise, or otherwise there would be no need 
to criminalize the conducting of the affairs of an enterprise through a 
pattern of such predicate offenses. As the Court reasoned in H.J. Inc., 
however, a ―pattern of racketeering activity‖ requires a relationship 
between the predicate offenses.
133
 This is an extra step beyond showing 
that they are connected to the enterprise. In effect, indirect relation 
obviates the need for the rest of the list in H.J. Inc. In that case, if the 
argument were correct, the Supreme Court need not have gone to the 
trouble of looking to § 3575. It could have just said that predicate offenses 
are related if they each relate to the enterprise. 
Also, the H.J. Inc. list concludes with the direction that predicate 
offenses are not ―isolated events.‖134 Indeed, the Court and the Second 
Circuit have both emphasized that isolated activity is not meant to be 
reached by RICO.
135
 Horizontal relatedness, as established by the list in 
H.J. Inc., is more likely to protect against RICO convictions of such 
isolated events. The definition of ―isolated‖ is ―[p]laced or standing apart 
or alone; detached or separated from other things or persons; unconnected 
with anything else; solitary.‖136  
Horizontal relatedness ensures that there is a connection between 
predicate offenses so that they can be considered a pattern. Horizontal 
relatedness is better able to protect against RICO convictions for predicate 
offenses that are ―detached or separated‖ from each other. Indirect 
relation, i.e., vertical relatedness, allows the relation of ―detached or 
separated‖ predicate offenses.  
 
 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006) (―It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
with any enterprise . . . .‖). 
 133. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238–39. 
 134. Id. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)). 
 135. Id. at 239 (―A pattern is not formed by ‗sporadic activity‘ . . . and a person cannot ‗be 
subjected to the sanctions of [RICO] simply for committing two widely separated and isolated criminal 
offenses‘ . . . .‖ (quoting, respectively, S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158 (1969) and 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 
(1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan)); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 
1989); United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 136. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 123 (James A. H. Murray et al. eds., 2d ed., 1989). 
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B. RICO Has a Flexible Nature, and Should Not Be Confined By Formal 
Categories 
Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have emphasized the 
flexible nature of RICO.
137
 The second argument suggests that drawing a 
distinct line between horizontal and vertical relatedness would create 
formal categories, defeating Congress‘s intent.138 Indirect relation, it can 
be argued, is more faithful to this congressional intent because it is more 
flexible. 
However, indirect relation allows two predicate offenses, without 
more, to form a pattern. One of the basic principles of H.J. Inc. is that 
there must be something beyond the number of predicate offenses to form 
a pattern.
139
 It is for this reason that the Supreme Court set out the 
―continuity plus relationship‖ test. Two predicate offenses may be 
isolated, in that they are ―detached or separated from other things or 
 
 
 137. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238 (―It is reasonable to infer . . . that Congress intended to take a 
flexible approach . . . .‖); United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2006). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court noted that there may be overlap of evidence. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239. However, it 
stated that this overlap occurs between the continuity and relationship prongs of the test. Id. This 
overlap helps to retain the flexibility envisaged by Congress. 
 138. See Daidone, 471 F.3d at 375. At least one district court in the Second Circuit has expressed 
frustration with all of the interpretations and requirements that have been pronounced by different 
courts over the years. United States v. Bellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d 561, 564–66 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). The 
exasperation felt by the court was palpable. ―To collect and recite even a minute sampling of [RICO] 
cases . . . would be an ambitious exercise if not an exercise in intellectual frustration and provide such 
guidance as the Court may wish them to provide in arriving at a decision.‖ Id. at 565. In a footnote, the 
court stated ―[i]f one objective of precedent is to provide some guidance for future conduct with 
relative assurance that such conduct is within the law, the precedents in this area have missed the mark 
by a wide margin.‖ Id. at 565 n.1. Instead of looking to whether requirements like vertical and 
horizontal relatedness were satisfied, the court opted for a ―realistic, common sense‖ approach. Id. at 
565.  
 This may have been acceptable in that case, which involved the prosecution of Vincent Gigante, 
the boss of the Genovese Organized Crime Family. Id. at 564. But there is a difference between the 
boss of a major La Cosa Nostra family and the person who cleans his office. See United States v. 
Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). In Viola, defendant Formisano was the janitor and handyman for 
the boss of a criminal enterprise. He was convicted of RICO for twice transporting goods for his boss. 
This conviction was overturned because ―[t]here was no evidence that [Formisano] was even aware of 
the broader enterprise.‖ Id.  
 Although the Viola court did not base its ruling on a lack of vertical or horizontal relatedness, it 
did look to the reasoning of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (operation or management 
test). The point is that the Viola court had to look to one of the ―sophisticated rules qualified by subtle 
nuances and Talmudic distinctions‖ that the Bellomo court was so quick to condemn. Bellomo, 263 F. 
Supp. 2d at 565. Had the Viola court taken the common sense approach, a janitor may have gone to 
prison for violating RICO.  
 139. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
McClellan)). The Supreme Court expressly rejected the use of two predicate offenses, without more, to 
find a pattern. Id. at 236. 
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persons,‖140 but are still vertically related to the enterprise. Although 
Congress intended a flexible approach to the pattern concept, it also 
intended a ―more stringent requirement‖ than just two predicate 
offenses.
141
 
Beyond this, if the development of the ―continuity plus relationship‖ 
test and the horizontal and vertical relatedness elements were permissible 
interpretations of § 1962, then it cannot be said that disallowing indirect 
relation would reduce its flexibility. Otherwise, H.J. Inc. and vertical and 
horizontal relatedness would fail for the same reason. Maximum flexibility 
would be realized by only requiring that there be two predicate offenses, 
as under the Second Circuit‘s pre-Indelicato precedent.142 If flexibility is 
the trait desired, then H.J. Inc. was wrongly decided because it does not 
provide the maximum flexibility possible. Requiring horizontal 
relatedness does not diminish the flexibility of RICO within the bounds 
intended by Congress. After all, the list in H.J. Inc. itself is a broad and 
open-ended group of factors.
143
 
C. RICO Is Meant to Reach Highly Adaptable Criminals 
The third argument suggests that disallowing the use of indirect 
relation would ossify § 1962 to the point that it could not reach these 
highly adaptable criminals. Indeed, one of the sponsors of RICO 
emphasized the fact that the list of predicate offenses was long in light of 
the resourcefulness of the criminals at whom the statute was aimed.
144
  
The response to this argument is that RICO in its present application 
possibly contains a troubling amount of overbreadth.
145
 The Supreme 
 
 
 140. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 123 (James A. H. Murray et al. eds., 2d ed., 1989). 
 141. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237. 
 142. See United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 143. The list in H.J. Inc. is not exhaustive. The language ―otherwise . . . interrelated by 
distinguishing characteristics‖ allows courts to recognize new factors. This would be part of the further 
development by the lower courts envisioned in the case. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243. The Second Circuit 
has recognized that this list is a starting point, not the end of the inquiry. United States v. Daidone, 471 
F.3d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2006) (―We read the list . . . [as] a starting point for the relatedness inquiry as a 
whole . . . .‖). 
 144. 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) (―It is impossible to draw an 
effective statute which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not 
include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well.‖). See Lynch (pts. 
1 & 2), supra note 7, at 686–88, for a discussion of the difficulty in defining ―organized crime.‖ 
 145. See, e.g., H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 255–56 (Scalia, J., concurring) (raising possibility of 
constitutional vagueness challenge to RICO); Reed, supra note 79, at 720–32. Reed conducts a 
detailed discussion of why RICO, and the pattern element in particular, is open to a vagueness 
challenge. 
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Court has noted that the statute uses expansive terms.
146
 This is 
confounded by the use of such broad federal criminal statutes as the 
mail
147
 and wire
148
 fraud statutes as predicate offenses.
149
 As discussed 
above,
150
 Congress has implicitly accepted the broad application of RICO 
by not amending it. In light of the pervasive criticism of RICO‘s breadth, 
some limit must be placed on it. This limitation must come from the 
courts.
151
 
Requiring a more distinct separation between horizontal and vertical 
relatedness is simply one limit on the breadth of RICO. It cannot be denied 
that RICO has been a valuable prosecutorial tool in the conviction of 
criminals that would otherwise be immune from prosecution.
152
 However, 
even with a distinct separation between horizontal and vertical relatedness 
elements, RICO retains a number of advantages for the prosecution.
153
  
 
 
 There is also a federalism argument that RICO allows the government to intrude into affairs that 
should be left to the states. Id. RICO allows state crimes to form predicate offenses. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(1) (2006). But a violation of a specific state criminal statute need not be shown. It is only 
necessary that the conduct be chargeable under state law. Id. Thus, the argument is that federal 
prosecutors are pursuing convictions for activity that should be charged and punished under state law. 
However, further explanation of this argument is beyond the scope of this note. 
 146. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (noting Congress‘s consistent use of terms 
and concepts of breadth in RICO); H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237.  
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 148. Id. § 1343. 
 149. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (noting broad use of civil RICO 
due to breadth of predicate offenses); H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236 (expansive use of RICO due to breadth 
of predicate offenses applies both to civil and criminal context); see also Barsoomian, supra note 79, 
at 920 (―In particular, the inclusion of mail, wire, and securities fraud as predicate acts is often blamed 
for the explosive use of RICO over the past ten years.‖). 
 150. See supra Part I. 
 151. See supra Part II.A.  
 152. Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 664. One of the major deficiencies in the federal criminal 
laws before RICO was enacted was inadequate punishment. These laws provided no way to cut off the 
flow of money which is an organized crime group‘s lifeblood. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 78 (1969). If a 
member was sent to prison, there were others ready to fill in the gap. Id. The flow of money would 
continue uninterrupted. RICO addressed this lack by including a criminal forfeiture provision, § 1963, 
which provides that a convicted defendant must forfeit his interest in the enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 
(2006). Thus, a RICO conviction can severely damage the financial resources of a RICO enterprise. 
 153. See Lynch (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 7, at 740 (joinder of defendants in same trial that would 
otherwise require separate trials); see also Lynch (pts. 3 & 4), supra note 7, for a discussion of the 
ways in which RICO as a whole has been used advantageously by prosecutors. These include 
jurisdictional reach to crimes that would otherwise fall under state law, RICO‘s use as an expanded 
conspiracy statute, and its use as a penalty enhancer. Id. Another commentator argues that ―[t]he 
relationship requirement should therefore be applied to every act, event, and circumstance purported to 
evince a RICO pattern.‖ Flowers, supra note 18, at 732. This reasoning would allow prosecutors to 
offer evidence beyond the predicate offenses charged, making it easier to prove a pattern. This is 
arguably the course taken by the court in United States v. Dinome, 954 F.2d 839, 843 (2d Cir. 1992). 
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. However, Flowers cautions that ―[t]hese facts are relevant 
only if related to each other in a manner which demonstrates organized and systematic criminal 
conduct.‖ Flowers, supra note 18, at 732. 
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It must also be remembered that to obtain a conviction under RICO the 
defendant must necessarily have committed two underlying offenses.
154
 If 
there is sufficient evidence to prove that these offenses were committed 
for purposes of RICO, then the defendant could very easily face the 
normal punishment for these offenses without recourse to RICO.
155
 In 
 
 
 Also, when predicate offenses are charged because they would be violations of state law, RICO 
does not incorporate state definitions of those crimes or state procedure. See United States v. Diaz, 176 
F.3d 52, 87 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 675 (2d Cir. 1997). ―The statute is 
meant to define, in a more generic sense, the wrongful conduct that constitutes the predicates for a 
federal racketeering charge.‖ United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 1986). This has the 
advantage of excusing federal prosecutors from becoming experts on state law when they bring a 
RICO charge. Definitions of crimes vary from state to state. If state definitions applied, a prosecutor 
that proved arson as a predicate offense in one state may not be able to prove arson in another state 
given the same facts. This would create a complex patchwork of case law, while at the same time 
providing loopholes for sophisticated criminals. But since state law crimes that serve as predicate 
offenses are considered in the generic, a federal prosecutor can rely on stare decisis. A prosecutor that 
proves arson as a predicate offense in the Southern District of New York can use that decision while 
proving arson as a predicate offense in the Middle District of California.  
 154. This is implicit from the fact that § 1962 requires evidence of a pattern of racketeering 
activity. The definition of ―pattern‖ requires, at a minimum, two acts of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(5) (2006). The possibility exists that the defendant could be convicted for collection of 
unlawful debt. Id. § 1962(a)-(c). Whether or not the collection of unlawful debt is subject to the pattern 
requirement is in doubt. See supra note 110. However, this does undermine the fact that the defendant 
has committed some underlying offense. 
 155. This does not take into account any statutes of limitation which may preclude charges for 
these offenses being brought. One advantage of RICO is that it provides for a somewhat indefinite 
statute of limitations, even taking into account the normal five-year statute of limitations for non-
capital offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006). The definition of pattern requires only that the last 
predicate offense charged ―occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the 
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.‖ Id. § 1961(5). For a RICO conviction, at least one 
predicate offense had to occur during the five-year statute of limitations. See United States v. Persico, 
832 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1987). If the last act of racketeering activity charged against a defendant 
was in 2003, but he had been in prison from 1990 until 2003, then theoretically he could be charged 
under RICO if he committed a related predicate offense in 1980. The gravamen of a RICO charge 
under § 1962(c) is conducting the affairs of a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity, not the underlying activity itself. Therefore, it does not matter if the predicate offenses 
themselves would be barred by statutes of limitation. RICO merely requires proof of their occurrence, 
not that they occurred within a period of time not barred by a statute of limitations.  
 This advantage of avoiding statutes of limitations also illustrates how important it is to have 
distinct horizontal and vertical relatedness requirements. See United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 697 
(2d Cir. 1990). In Long, only three of the charged predicate offenses occurred within the five-year 
statute of limitations. Id. If none of these offenses had been related to other predicate offenses, then the 
RICO prosecution would have been time barred. On the other hand, if indirect relation were used the 
statute of limitations would have proved to be no obstacle if the predicate offenses were related to the 
enterprise. This is one of the inherent dangers of using indirect relation. A defendant could commit 
two offenses which are wholly unrelated except for the fact that they are both vertically related to an 
enterprise. They may be the only crimes that the defendant has ever committed. They could be fifteen 
years apart. Under indirect relation, the defendant would still be guilty of RICO. It is hard to see how 
these offenses could be seen as other than ―two widely separated and isolated‖ offenses, which are 
beyond the purview of the statute. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 236, 239 (1989).  
 For another example of the advantage that RICO gives prosecutors in avoiding statutes of 
limitations, see United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371 (2d. Cir. 2006). In Daidone, two of the 
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some cases, the defendant may not merit the harsh federal punishments 
available under RICO.
156
 Providing for a more distinct separation between 
horizontal and vertical relatedness elements does not necessarily entail that 
these criminals won‘t be convicted and punished for crimes that they have 
committed. This single limit may simply exclude those defendants who do 
not necessarily merit the harsh punishments of RICO.
157
  
V. PROPOSAL 
The line between horizontal and vertical relatedness has been erased by 
the practice of allowing indirect relation to prove horizontal relatedness. 
The Second Circuit should reject this practice. The Supreme Court‘s 
pronouncement in H.J. Inc. provided the foundation for the separation of 
these two elements. The Second Circuit should return to this foundation by 
once again requiring an interrelationship between predicate offenses 
beyond vertical relatedness to the enterprise. Such a decision would not 
only reaffirm the principles underlying the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
H.J. Inc., but would provide a single—though much-needed—limit on 
RICO. 
This limit would help ensure that isolated acts are not subjected to the 
severe penalties that accompany a RICO conviction. Such isolated acts 
have been consistently held to be outside the purview of RICO.
158
 These 
acts should be prosecuted under the laws that they violate. If Congress 
sees fit, it can amend RICO to include such isolated acts. But this decision 
should be left with Congress. 
This limit would not reduce the efficacy of RICO in accomplishing its 
goal of eliminating criminal enterprises and their influence over legitimate 
businesses. RICO would still retain many advantages for prosecutors, such 
 
 
predicate offenses charged took place in 1989 and 1990. Id. at 373. The defendant had also taken part 
in loansharking from 1988 to 1999. Id. Although the defendant was first indicted in 2002 and tried in 
2004, the prosecution was able to use events that had taken place in 1989 and 1990 to secure a RICO 
conviction. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4, 7, United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 
2006) (No. 04-3784-cr), 2004 WL 5280159. 
 156. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (providing up to twenty years or life imprisonment, fines, and 
mandatory forfeiture). 
 157. For an example of a defendant who was acquitted of the § 1962(c) charge against him, see 
United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994). Defendant Formisano worked for the leader of a 
criminal enterprise doing janitorial work. On two occasions he transported stolen goods for his 
employer and returned the proceeds. It was on the basis of these two acts that he was prosecuted under 
RICO. The Second Circuit reversed his conviction. Id. at 43. Although his acts could be said to be 
horizontally related, his case is illustrative of the fact that RICO charges are brought against those who 
plainly do not merit RICO punishment.  
 158. See, e.g., H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239.  
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as joinder, venue, and evidentiary advantages.
159
 It also has the advantage 
of including broad statutes like money laundering, mail fraud, and wire 
fraud as predicate offenses. These broad statutes combine with the breadth 
of RICO itself to provide the flexibility needed to capture and punish 
highly adaptable criminals. 
In the alternative, the Second Circuit could dispense with the terms 
―horizontal‖ and ―vertical‖ relatedness. As discussed in Part III, the 
majority of circuits look to the list of factors in H.J. Inc. to determine the 
relationship prong of the ―continuity plus relationship‖ test. At the same 
time, they recognize that there must be a nexus between the predicate 
offenses and the enterprise. This Note has argued that such an analysis is 
equivalent to the Second Circuit‘s practice, in that it looks both to 
interrelationship between predicate acts, and to the relation of those acts to 
the RICO enterprise. Dispensing with the terms ―horizontal‖ and 
―vertical,‖ however, could emphasize the reality that there are two separate 
requirements. The Second Circuit could then end its use of the erroneous 
practice of indirect relation.  
If nothing else, the Second Circuit should abolish the distinction 
between vertical and horizontal relatedness. Instead of paying lip service 
to horizontal relatedness, it could unequivocally state that vertical 
relatedness is all that is needed. If it recognized that the use of indirect 
relation has virtually eliminated the horizontal relatedness requirement, it 
could cure the inconsistency of application in its case law. Defendants and 
defense lawyers would have notice that horizontal relatedness is a fruitless 
argument, saving time and money. As this Note has argued, such an 
approach would be completely inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in H.J. Inc., but it would at least be honest about the reality of 
Second Circuit practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal RICO has a long history of broad interpretation and expansive 
use. Congress‘s implicit authorization of this practice leads to the 
necessity of judicial action if any limits are to be imposed. The Supreme 
Court in H.J. Inc. made a permissible interpretation of the broad definition 
of ―pattern of racketeering.‖ This was done for the purpose of providing 
some guidance to the Courts of Appeals, while at the same time protecting 
against the use of RICO prosecutions where predicate offenses are isolated 
 
 
 159. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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acts. However, the Supreme Court left further development to the lower 
courts. The Second Circuit‘s elaboration of the horizontal and vertical 
relatedness elements was a part of this development. Horizontal and 
vertical relatedness are themselves logically consistent with both the 
words of § 1962(c) and the decision in H.J. Inc.  
Daidone is the Second Circuit‘s most recent decision dealing with 
horizontal and vertical relatedness. That decision reaffirmed the practice of 
using indirect relation to prove horizontal relatedness, while at the same 
time stating that horizontal and vertical relatedness are meant to provide 
outer limits on RICO‘s use. Does the reasoning in Daidone really establish 
that there are outer limits? The answer to this question is no. Indirect 
relation erases the line between horizontal and vertical relatedness, and is 
unfaithful to the decision in H.J. Inc. There should be a more distinct 
separation between these elements. This can be done by eliminating the 
use of indirect relation. This approach would provide a single limitation on 
RICO‘s broad application without sacrificing the flexibility of RICO. 
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